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Abstract
Min-max saddle point games appear in a wide range of applications in machine leaning and
signal processing. Despite their wide applicability, theoretical studies are mostly limited to the
special convex-concave structure. While some recent works generalized these results to special
smooth non-convex cases, our understanding of non-smooth scenarios is still limited. In this work,
we study special form of non-smooth min-max games when the objective function is (strongly)
convex with respect to one of the player’s decision variable. We show that a simple multi-step
proximal gradient descent-ascent algorithm converges to -first-order Nash equilibrium of the
min-max game with the number of gradient evaluations being polynomial in 1/. We will also
show that our notion of stationarity is stronger than existing ones in the literature. Finally, we
evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm through adversarial attack on a LASSO
estimator.
Keywords— Non-convex min-max games, First-order Nash equilibria, Proximal gradient descent ascent
1 Introduction
Non-convex min-max saddle point games appear in a wide range of applications such as training Generative
Adversarial Networks [1, 2, 3, 4], fair statistical inference [5, 6, 7], and training robust neural networks and
systems [8, 9, 10]. In such a game, the goal is to solve the optimization problem of the form
min
θ∈Θ
max
α∈A
f(θ,α), (1)
which can be considered as a two player game where one player aims at increasing the objective, while the other
tries to minimize the objective. Using game theoretic point of view, we may aim for finding Nash equilibria [11]
in which no player can do better off by unilaterally changing its strategy. Unfortunately, finding/checking
such Nash equilibria is hard in general [12] for non-convex objective functions. Moreover, such Nash equilibria
might not even exist. Therefore, many works focus on special cases such as convex-concave problems where
f(θ, .) is concave for any given θ and f(.,α) is convex for any given α. Under this assumption, different
algorithms such as optimistic mirror descent [13, 14, 15, 16], Frank-Wolfe algorithm [17, 18] and Primal-Dual
method [19] have been studied.
In the general non-convex settings, [20] considers the weakly convex-concave case and proposes a primal-dual
based approach for finding approximate stationary solutions. More recently, the research works [21, 22, 23, 24]
∗This arXiv submission includes the details of the proofs for the paper accepted for publication in the proceeding
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examine the min-max problem in non-convex-(strongly)-concave cases and proposed first-order algorithms
for solving them. Some of the results have been accelerated in the “Moreau envelope regime” by the recent
interesting work [25]. This work first starts by studying the problem in smooth strongly convex-concave
and convex-concave settings, and proposes an algorithm based on the combination of Mirror-Prox [26]
and Nesterov’s accelerated gradient descent [27] methods. Then the algorithm is extended to the smooth
non-convex-concave scenario. Some of the aforementioned results are extended to zeroth-order methods
for solving non-convex-concave min-max optimization problems [28, 29]. As a first step toward solving
non-convex non-concave min-max problems, [23] studies a class of games in which one of the players satisfies
the Polyak- Lojasiewic(PL) condition and the other player has a general non-convex structure. More recently,
the work [30] studied the two sided PL min-max games and proposed a variance reduced strategy for solving
these games.
While almost all existing efforts focus on smooth min-max problems, in this work, we study non-differentiable,
non-convex-strongly-concave and non-convex-concave games and propose an algorithm for computing their
first-order Nash equilibria.
2 Problem Definition
Consider the min-max zero-sum game
min
θ∈Θ
max
α∈A
(f(θ,α) , h(θ,α)− p(α) + q(θ)), (2)
where we assume that the constraint sets and the objective function satisfy the following assumptions
throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. The sets Θ ⊆ Rdθ and A ⊆ Rdα are convex and compact. Moreover, there exist two separate
balls with radius R that contains the feasible sets A and Θ.
Assumption 2. The functions h(θ,α) is continuously differentiable, p(·) and q(·) are convex and (potentially)
non-differentiable, p(·) is Lp-Lipschitz continuous and q(·) is continuous.
Assumption 3. The function h(θ,α) is continuously differentiable in both θ and α and there exist constants
L11, L22 and L12 such that for every α,α1,α2 ∈ A, and θ,θ1,θ2 ∈ Θ, we have
‖∇θh(θ1,α)−∇θh(θ2,α)‖ ≤ L11‖θ1 − θ2‖,
‖∇αh(θ,α1)−∇αh(θ,α2)‖ ≤ L22‖α1 −α2‖,
‖∇αh(θ1,α)−∇αh(θ2,α)‖ ≤ L12‖θ1 − θ2‖,
‖∇θh(θ,α1)−∇θh(θ,α2)‖ ≤ L12‖α1 −α2‖.
To proceed, let us first define some preliminary concepts:
Definition 1. (Directional Derivative) Let ψ : Rn → R and x¯ ∈ dom(ψ). The directional derivative of ψ at
the point x¯ along the direction d is defined as
ψ
′
(x¯; d) = lim
τ↓0
ψ(x¯ + τd)− ψ(x¯)
τ
.
We say that ψ is directionally differentiable at x¯ if the above limit exists for all d ∈ Rn. It can be shown that
any convex function is directionally differentiable.
Definition 2. (FNE) A point (θ∗,α∗) ∈ Θ×A is a first-order Nash equilibrium (FNE) of the game (2) if
f ′θ(θ∗,α∗;θ − θ∗) ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ,
f ′α(θ∗,α∗;α−α∗) ≤ 0 ∀α ∈ A;
2
or equivalently if
〈∇θh(θ∗,α∗),θ − θ∗〉+ q(θ)− q(θ∗) + M2 ||θ − θ
∗||2 ≥ 0,
〈∇αh(θ∗,α∗),α−α∗〉 − p(α) + p(α∗)− M2 ||α−α
∗||2 ≤ 0,
for all θ ∈ Θ and α ∈ A; and all M > 0.
This definition implies that, at the first-order Nash equilibrium point, each player satisfies the
first-order necessary optimality condition of its own objective when the other player’s strategy is
fixed. This is also equivalent to saying we have found the solution to the corresponding variational
inequality [31]. Moreover, in the unconstrained smooth case that Θ = Rdθ , A = Rdα , and p ≡ q ≡ 0,
this definition reduces to the standard widely used definition ∇αh(θ∗,α∗) = 0 and ∇θh(θ∗,α∗) = 0.
In practice, we use iterative methods for solving such games and it is natural to evaluate the
performance of the algorithms based on their efficiency in finding an approximate-FNE point. To
this end, let us define the concept of approximate-FNE point:
Definition 3. (Approximate-FNE) A point (θ¯, α¯) is said to be an –first-order Nash equilibrium
(–FNE) of the game (2) if
X (θ¯, α¯) ≤ 2 and Y(θ¯, α¯) ≤ 2,
where
X (θ¯, α¯) , −2L11 min
θ∈Θ
[
〈∇θh(θ¯, α¯),θ − θ¯〉+ q(θ)− q(θ¯) + L112 ||θ − θ¯||
2
]
,
and
Y(θ¯, α¯) , 2L22 max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θ¯, α¯),α− α¯〉 − p(α) + p(α¯)− L222 ||α− α¯||
2
]
.
In the unconstrained and smooth scenario that Θ = Rdθ , A = Rdα , and p ≡ q ≡ 0, the above -FNE
definition reduces to ‖∇αh(θ¯, α¯)‖ ≤  and ‖∇θh(θ¯, α¯)‖ ≤ .
Remark 1. The above definition of –FNE is stronger than the -stationarity concept defined based
on the proximal gradient norm in the literature (see, e.g., [32]). Details of this remark is discussed
in the Appendix section.
Remark 2. (Rephrased from Proposition 4.2 in [33]) For the min-max game (2), under assumptions
1, 2 and 3, FNE always exists. Moreover, it is easy to show that X (·, ·) and Y(·, ·) are continuous
functions in their arguments. Hence, –FNE exists for every  ≥ 0.
In what follows, we consider two different scenarios for finding -FNE points. In the first scenario,
we assume that h(θ,α) is strongly concave in α for every given θ and develop a first-order algorithm
for finding -FNE. Then, in the second scenario, we extend our result to the case where h(θ,α) is
concave (but not strongly concave) in α for every given θ.
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3 Non-Convex Strongly-Concave Games
In this section, we study the zero-sum game (2) in the case that the function h(θ,α) is σ-strongly
concave in α for every given value of θ. To understand the idea behind the algorithm, let us define
the auxiliary function
g(θ) , max
α∈A
h(θ,α)− p(α).
A “conceptual” algorithm for solving the min-max optimization problem (2) is to minimize the
function g(θ) + q(θ) using iterative decent procedures. First, notice that, based on the following
lemma, the strong concavity assumption implies the differentiability of g(θ).
Lemma 1. Let g(θ) = max
α∈A
h(θ,α)− p(α) in which the function h(θ,α) is σ-strongly concave in
α for any given θ. Then, under Assumption 3, the function g(θ) is differentiable. Moreover, its
gradient is Lg-Lipschitz continuous, i.e.,
‖∇g(θ1)−∇g(θ2)‖ ≤ Lg‖θ1 − θ2‖,
where Lg = L11 +
L212
σ
.
The smoothness of the function g(θ) suggests the natural multi-step proximal method in Algorithm 1
for solving the min-max optimization problem (2). This algorithm performs two major steps in each
iteration: the first major step, which is marked as “Accelerated Proximal Gradient Ascent”, runs
multiple iterations of the accelerated proximal gradient ascent to estimate the solution of the inner
maximization problem. In other words, this step finds a point αt+1 such that
αt+1 ≈ arg max
α∈A
f(θt,α).
The output of this step will then be used to compute the approximate proximal gradient of the
function g(θ) in the second step based on the classical Danskin’s theorem [34, 35], which is restated
below:
Theorem 1 (Rephrased from [34, 35]). Let V ⊂ Rm be a compact set and J(u,ν) : Rn × V 7→ R
be differentiable with respect to u. Let J¯(u) = max
ν∈V
J(u,ν) and assume Vˆ (u) = {ν ∈ V | J(u,ν) =
J¯(u)} is singleton for any given u. Then, J¯(u) is differentiable and ∇uJ¯(u) = ∇uJ(u, νˆ) with
νˆ ∈ Vˆ (u).
According to the above lemma, the proximal gradient descent update rule on g(θ) will be given by
θt+1 = arg min
θ∈Θ
[
q(θ) + 〈∇θh(θt,αt+1),θ − θt〉+ Lg2 ‖θ − θt‖
2
]
.
The two main proximal gradient update operators used in Algorithm 1 are defines as
ρα(θ˜, α˜, γ1) = arg max
α∈A
〈∇αh(θ˜, α˜),α− α˜〉 − γ12 ‖α− α˜‖
2 − p(α)
and
ρθ(θ˜, α˜, γ2) = arg min
θ∈Θ
〈∇θh(θ˜, α˜),θ − θ˜〉+ γ22 ‖θ − θ˜‖
2 + q(θ).
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The following theorem establishes the rate of convergence of Algorithm 1 to -FNE. A more detailed
statement of the theorem (which includes the constants of the theorem) is presented in the Appendix
section.
Theorem 2. [Informal Statement] Consider the min-max zero-sum game
min
θ∈Θ
max
α∈A
(
f(θ,α) = h(θ,α)− p(α) + q(θ)
)
,
where function h(θ,α) is σ−strongly concave in α for any given θ. In Algorithm 1, if we choose
η1 = 1L22 , η2 =
1
Lg
, N =
√
8L22/σ − 1; and K and T large enough such that
T ≥ NT () , O(−2) and K ≥ NK() , O(log
(
−1)
)
,
then there exists an iterate t ∈ {0, · · · , T − 1} such that (θt,αt+1) is an –FNE of (2).
Algorithm 1 Multi-step Accelerated Proximal Gradient Descent-Ascent
1: Input: K, T , N , η1, η2, α0 ∈ A and θ0 ∈ Θ.
2: for t = 0, · · · , T − 1 do
3: for k = 0, · · · , bK/Nc do
4: Set β1 = 1 and x0 = αt
5: if k = 0 then
6: y1 = x0
7: else
8: y1 = xN
9: end if
10: for j = 1, 2, . . . , N do
11: Set xj = ρα(θt,yj , η1)
12: Set βj+1 =
1 +
√
1 + 4β2j
2
13: yj+1 = xj +
(βj − 1
βj+1
)
(xj − xj−1)
14: end for
15: end for
16: αt+1 = xN
17: θt+1 = ρθ(θt,αt+1, η2)
18: end for
Accelerated
Proximal
Gradient
Ascent [27, 36]
Corollary 1. Based on Theorem 1, to find an -FNE of the game (2), Algorithm 1 requires
O(−2 log(−1)) gradients evaluations of the objective function.
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4 Non-Convex Concave Games
In this section, we consider the min-max problem (2) under the assumption that h(θ,α) is concave
(but not strongly concave) in α for any given value of θ. In this case, the direct extension of
Algorithm 1 will not work since the function g(θ) might be non-differentiable. To overcome this issue,
we start by making the function f(θ,α) strongly concave by adding a “negligible” regularization.
More specifically, we define
fλ(θ,α) = f(θ,α)− λ2 ‖α− αˆ‖
2, (3)
for some αˆ ∈ A. We then apply Algorithm 1 to the modified non-convex-strongly-concave game
min
θ∈Θ
max
α∈A
fλ(θ,α). (4)
It can be shown that by choosing λ = 2√2R , when we apply Algorithm 1 to the modified game (4),
we obtain an -FNE of the original problem (2). More specifically, with a proper choice of parameters,
the following theorem establishes that the proposed method converges to -FNE point of the original
problem.
Theorem 3. [Informal Statement] Set η1 = 1/(L22 + λ), η2 = 1/(L11 + L212/λ), λ =

2R , N =√
8L22/λ− 1, and apply Algorithm 1 to the regularized min-max problem (4). Choose K,T large
enough such that T ≥ NT () , O(−3), and K ≥ NK() , O
(
−1/2 log(−1)
)
. Then, there exists
t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} in Algorithm 1 such that (θt,αt+1) is an -FNE of the original problem (2).
Corollary 2. Based on Theorem 3, Algorithm 1 requires O(−3.5 log(−1)) gradient evaluations in
order to find a -FNE of the game (2).
5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm for the problem of attacking
the LASSO estimator. In other words, our goal is to find a small perturbation of the observation
matrix that worsens the performance of the LASSO estimator in the training set. This attack
problem can be formulated as
max
A∈B(Aˆ,∆)
min
x
‖Ax− b‖22 + ξ‖x‖1, (5)
where B(Aˆ,∆) = {A | ||A − Aˆ||2F ≤ ∆} and the matrix A ∈ Rm×n. We set m = 100, n = 500,
ξ = 1 and ∆ = 10−1. In our experiments, first we generate a “ground-truth” vector x∗ with sparsity
level s = 25 in which the location of the non-zero elements are chosen randomly and their values
are sampled from a standard Gaussian distribution. Then, we generate the elements of matrix A
using standard Gaussian distribution. Finally, we set b = Ax∗ + e, where e ∼ N(0, 0.001I). We
compare the performance of the proposed algorithm with the popular subgradient descent-ascent
and proximal gradient descent-ascent algorithms. In the subgradient descent-ascent algorithm, at
each iteration, we take one step of sub-gradient ascent step with respect to x followed by one steps of
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sub-gradient ascent in A. Similarly, each iteration of the proximal gradient descent-ascent algorithm
consists of one step of proximal gradient descent with respect to x and one step of proximal gradient
descent with respect to A.
To have a fair comparison, all of the studied algorithms have been initialized at the same random
points in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: (left): Convergence behavior of different algorithms in terms of the objective value. The objective
value at iteration t is defined as g(At) , minx ‖Atx−b‖22 + ξ‖x‖1, (right): Convergence behavior of different
algorithms in terms of the stationarity measures X (At,xt+1), Y(At,xt+1) (logarithmic scale). The list of
the algorithms used in the comparison is as follows: Proposed Algorithm (PA), Subgradient Descent-Ascent
(SDA), and Proximal Descent-Ascent algorithm (PDA).
The above figure might not be a fair comparison since each step of the proposed algorithm is
computationally more expensive than the two benchmark methods. To have a better comparison,
we evaluate the performance of the algorithms in terms of the required time for convergence. Table 1
summarizes the average time required for different algorithms for finding a point (A¯, x¯) satisfying
X (A¯, x¯) ≤ 0.1 and Y(A¯, x¯) ≤ 0.1. The average is taken over 100 different experiments. As can be
seen in the table, the proposed method in average converges an order of magnitude faster than the
other two algorithms.
Algorithm PA SDA PDA
Average time (seconds) 0.0268 3.5016 0.5603
Standard deviation (seconds) 0.0538 7.0137 1.1339
Table 1: Average computational time of different algorithms.
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Appendix
Discussions on Remark 1: Consider the optimization problem
min
z∈Z
F (z), (6)
in which the set Z is bounded and convex; and F (·) : Rn 7→ R is `-smooth, i.e.,
‖∇F (z1)−∇F (z2)‖ ≤ `‖z1 − z2‖.
One of the commonly used definitions of -stationary point for the optimization problem (6) is as
follows.
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Definition 4 (-stationary point of the first type). A point z¯ is said to be an -stationary point of
the first type of (6) if ∥∥∥∥PZ (z¯− 1`∇F (z¯)
)
− z¯
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ` , (7)
where PZ(·) represents the projection operator to the feasible set Z.
Another notion of stationarity, which is used in this paper (as well as other works including [37]), is
defined as follows.
Definition 5 (-stationary point of the second type). A point z¯ is said to be an -stationary point
of the second type for the optimization problem (6) if
D(z¯) ≤ 2, (8)
where D(z¯) , −2`min
z∈Z
[
〈∇F (z¯), z− z¯〉+ `2‖z− z¯‖2
]
.
The following theorem shows that the stationarity definition in (8) is strictly stronger than the
stationarity definition in (7).
Theorem 4. The -stationary concept of the second type is stronger than the -stationary concept
of the first type. In particular, if a point z¯ satisfies (8), then it must also satisfy (7). Moreover,
there exist an optimization problem with a given feasible point z¯ such that z¯ is -stationary point of
the first type, but it is not ′-stationary point of the second type for any ′ <
√
2+ 2.
Proof. We first show that (8) implies (7), i.e., if D(z¯) ≤ 2 then ‖PZ (z¯ + (1/`)∇F (z¯)) ‖ ≤ /`.
From definition of D(z¯), we have
D(z¯) ,− 2`min
z∈Z
[
〈∇F (z¯), z− z¯〉+ `2 ||z− z¯||
2
]
=− `2 min
z∈Z
[2
`
〈∇F (z¯), z− z¯〉+ ||z− z¯||2
]
=− `2 min
z∈Z
[
‖z− z¯ + 1
`
∇F (z¯)‖2 − 1
`2
‖∇F (z¯)‖2
]
=− `2 ‖PZ(z¯− 1
`
∇F (z¯))− (z¯− 1
`
∇F (z¯))‖2 + ‖∇F (z¯)‖2.
Defining zˆ = z¯− 1`∇F (z¯), we get
D(z¯) = −`2 ‖PZ(zˆ)− zˆ‖2 + ‖∇F (z¯)‖2. (9)
On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 2, the direct application of cosine equality implies that
‖1
`
∇F (z¯)‖2 = ‖PZ(zˆ)− z¯‖2 + ‖PZ(zˆ)− zˆ‖2 − 2(‖PZ(zˆ)− z¯‖)(‖PZ(zˆ)− zˆ‖) cos γ, (10)
where γ is the angle between the two vectors z¯−PZ(zˆ) and zˆ−PZ(zˆ). Moreover, from [38, Lemma
3.1] we know that cos γ ≤ 0. As a result,
`2‖PZ(zˆ)− z¯‖2 ≤ −`2 ‖PZ(zˆ)− zˆ‖2 + ‖∇F (z¯)‖2 = D(z¯),
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where the last equality is due to (9). Furthermore, since z¯ is an -stationery point, i.e., D(z¯) ≤ 2,
we conclude that ‖PZ(zˆ)− z¯‖ ≤ /`. In other words, z¯ is an -stationary point of the first type.
Figure 2: Relation between different notions of stationarity
Next we show that the stationarity concept in (8) is strictly stronger than the stationarity concept
in (7). To understand this, let us take an additional look at Fig. 2 and equation (10) used in the
proof above. Clearly, the two stationarity measures could coincide when cos γ = 0. Moreover, the
two notions have the largest gap when cos γ = −1. Fig. 3 shows both of these scenarios.
Figure 3: (left): γ = pi, two measures have the largest deviation, (right): γ = pi2 , two measures coincide
According to Fig. 3, in order to create an example with largest gap between the two stationarity
notions, we need to construct an example with the smallest possible value of cos γ. In particular,
consider the optimization problem
min
z
1
2z
2 s.t. z ≥ 1.
It is easy to check that the point z¯ = 1 +  is an -stationary point of the first type, while it is not
an ′-stationary point of the second type for any ′ <
√
2+ 2.
Next, we re-state the lemmas used in the main body of the paper and present detailed proof of
them.
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Lemma 1. Let g(θ) = max
α∈A
h(θ,α)− p(α) in which the function h(θ,α) is σ-strongly concave in
α for any given θ. Then, under Assumption 3, the function g(θ) is differentiable. Moreover, its
gradient is Lg-Lipschitz continuous, i.e.,
‖∇g(θ1)−∇g(θ2)‖ ≤ Lg‖θ1 − θ2‖,
where Lg = L11 +
L212
σ
.
Proof. The differentiability of the function g(θ) is obvious from Danskin’s Theorem 1. In order to
find the gradient’s Lipschitz constant, define l(θ,α) = −h(θ,α) + p(α). Let
α∗1 = arg min
α∈A
l(θ1,α) and α∗2 = arg min
α∈A
l(θ2,α).
Due to σ–strong convexity of l(θ,α) in α for any given θ, we have
l(θ2,α∗2) ≥ l(θ2,α∗1) + l
′(θ2,α∗1;α∗2 −α∗1) +
σ
2 ‖α
∗
2 −α∗1‖2,
and
l(θ2,α∗1) ≥ l(θ2,α∗2) + l
′(θ2,α∗2;α∗1 −α∗2) +
σ
2 ‖α
∗
2 −α∗1‖2.
Furthermore, due to optimality of α∗2, l
′(θ2,α∗2;α∗1 −α∗2) ≥ 0. As a result, by adding the above two
inequalities we have
− l′(θ2,α∗1;α∗2 −α∗1) ≥ σ‖α∗2 −α∗1‖2. (11)
On the other hand, from optimality of α∗1, we have
l
′(θ1,α∗1;α∗2 −α∗1) ≥ 0. (12)
Now, by adding (11) and (12) we get
σ‖α∗2 −α∗1‖2
≤ −l′(θ2,α∗1;α∗2 −α∗1) + l
′(θ1,α∗1;α∗2 −α∗1)
= 〈∇αh(θ2,α∗1),α∗2 −α∗1〉 − p
′(α∗1;α∗2 −α∗1)− 〈∇αh(θ1,α∗1),α∗2 −α∗1〉+ p
′(α∗1;α∗2 −α∗1)
= 〈∇αh(θ2,α∗1)−∇αh(θ1,α∗1),α∗2 −α∗1〉
≤ L12‖θ1 − θ2‖‖α∗2 −α∗1‖,
where the last inequality holds by Cauchy-Schwartz and the Lipschitzness from Assumption 3. As a
result, we get
‖α∗2 −α∗1‖ ≤
L12
σ
‖θ1 − θ2‖. (13)
Now, Theorem 1 implies that
‖∇θg(θ1)−∇θg(θ2)‖= ‖∇θh(θ1,α∗1)−∇θh(θ2,α∗2)‖
= ‖∇θh(θ1,α∗1)−∇θh(θ2,α∗1) +∇θh(θ2,α∗1)−∇θh(θ2,α∗2)‖
≤ L11‖θ1 − θ2‖+ L12‖α∗1 −α∗2‖
≤
(
L11 +
L212
σ
)
‖θ1 − θ2‖,
where the last inequality is due to (13).
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Lemma 2. (Rephrased from [39, 36]) Assume F (x) = m(x)+n(x), where m(x) is σ-strongly convex
and L-smooth, n(x) is convex and possibly non-smooth (and possibly extended real-valued). Then,
by applying accelerated proximal gradient descent algorithm with restart parameter N ,
√
8L/σ − 1
for K iterations, with K being a constant multiple of N , we get
F (xK)− F (x∗) ≤
(1
2
)K/N
(F (x0)− F (x∗)), (14)
where xK is the iterate obtained at iteration K and x∗ , arg min
x
F (x).
Lemma 3. Let αt+1 to be the output of the accelerated proximal gradient descent in Algorithm 1
at iteration t. Assume κ = L22
σ
≥ 1, and g(θt) − (h(θt,α0(θt))− p(α0(θt))) < ∆. Then for any
prescribed  ∈ (0, 1), choose K large enough such that
K ≥ 2√8κ
(
logL22 + log (2L22R+ gmax + Lp +R) + 2 log
(1

)
+ 12 log
(2∆
σ
))
,
where gmax = max
α∈A
‖∇αh(θt,α)‖. Then the error et , ∇θh(θt,αt+1)−∇g(θt) has a norm
‖et‖ ≤ δ , L12
L22(2L22R+ gmax + Lp +R)
2
and
2 ≥ Y(θt,αt+1) , L22 max
α∈A
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)− L222 ||α−αt+1||
2
Proof. From Lemma 2 we have,
g(θt)−
(
h(θt,αt+1)− p(αt+1)
) ≤ 1
2
K√
8κ
∆. (15)
Let α∗(θt) , arg max
α∈A
h(θt,α)− p(α). By combining (15) and strong concavity of h(θt,α)− p(α)
in α, we get
σ
2 ‖αt+1 −α
∗(θt)‖2 ≤ g(θt)−
(
h(θt,αt+1)− p(αt+1)
) ≤ 1
2
K√
8κ
∆.
Combining this inequality with Assumption 3 implies that
‖et‖ = ‖∇θh(θt,αt+1)−∇g(θt)‖ = ‖∇θh(θt,αt+1)−∇θh(θt,α∗(θt))‖
≤ L12‖αt+1 −α∗(θt)‖ ≤ L122K/2
√
8κ
√
2∆
σ
≤ L12
L22(2L22R+ gmax + Lp +R)
2,
where the last inequality comes from our choice of K.
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Next, let us prove the second part of the lemma. First notice that by some algebraic manipulations,
we can write
1
2L22
Y(θt,αt+1)
= max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)− L222 ||α−αt+1||
2
]
= max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)− L222 ||α−α
∗(θt) + α∗(θt)−αt+1||2
]
= max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)
− L222 ‖α−α
∗(θt)‖2 − L222 ‖α
∗(θt)−αt+1‖2 − L22〈α−α∗(θt),α∗(θt)−αt+1〉
]
= max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)− L222 ‖α−α
∗(θt)‖2
− L222 ‖α
∗(θt)−αt+1‖2 − L22〈α−α∗(θt),α∗(θt)−αt+1〉 − p(α∗(θt)) + p(α∗(θt))
]
.
Thus, we obtain
1
2L22
Y(θt,αt+1)
≤max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)
− L222 ‖α−α
∗(θt)‖2 − L22〈α−α∗(θt),α∗(θt)−αt+1〉 − p(α∗(θt)) + p(α∗(θt))
]
= max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1)−∇αh(θt,α∗(θt)),α−αt+1〉
+ 〈∇αh(θt,α∗(θt)),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)
− L222 ‖α−α
∗(θt)‖2 − L22〈α−α∗(θt),α∗(θt)−αt+1〉 − p(α∗(θt)) + p(α∗(θt))
]
≤max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1)−∇αh(θt,α∗(θt)),α−αt+1〉+ 〈∇αh(θt,α∗(θt)),α∗(θt)−αt+1〉
+ p(αt+1)− p(α∗(θt))− L22〈α−α∗(θt),α∗(θt)−αt+1〉
]
+ max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,α∗(θt)),α−α∗(θt)〉 − p(α) + p(α∗(θt))− L222 ‖α−α
∗(θt)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
]
≤max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1)−∇αh(θt,α∗(θt)),α−αt+1〉+ 〈∇αh(θt,α∗(θt)),α∗(θt)−αt+1〉
+ p(αt+1)− p(α∗(θt))− L22〈α−α∗(θt),α∗(θt)−αt+1〉
]
≤L22‖αt+1 −α∗(θt)‖R+ gmax‖αt+1 −α∗(θt)‖+ Lp‖αt+1 −α∗(θt)‖+RL22‖αt+1 −α∗(θt)‖
≤(L22R+ gmax + Lp +RL22)‖αt+1 −α∗(θt)‖.
15
As a result,
Y(θt,αt+1) ≤ L22(2L22R+ gmax + Lp)‖αt+1 −α∗(θt)‖
≤ L22(2L22R+ gmax + Lp) 12K/2
√
8κ
√
2∆
σ
≤ 2,
where the last inequality follows from the choice of K.
Theorem 2. [Formal Statement] Consider the min-max zero sum game
min
θ∈Θ
max
α∈A
(f(θ,α) = h(θ,α)− p(α) + q(θ)),
where the function h(θ,α) is σ−strongly concave. Let D = g(θ0) + q(θ0)−min
θ∈Θ
(g(θ) + q(θ)) where
g(θ) = maxα∈A h(θ,α)− p(α), and Lg = L11 + L
2
12
σ be the Lipschitz constant of the gradient of g.
In Algorithm 1, if we set η1 = 1L22 , η2 =
1
Lg
, N =
√
8L22/σ − 1 and choose K and T large enough
such that
T ≥ NT () , 4LgD
2
and
K ≥ NK() , 2
√
8κ
(
C + 2 log
(1

)
+ 12 log
(2∆
σ
))
,
where C = max
{
2 log 2 + log (LgL12R), logL22 + log (2L22R + gmax + Lp +R)
}
and κ = L22σ , then
there exists an iteration t ∈ {0, · · · , T} such that (θt,αt+1) is an –FNE of (2).
Proof. First, by descent lemma we have
g(θt+1) + q(θt+1)
≤ g(θt) + 〈∇θg(θt),θt+1 − θt〉+ Lg2 ‖θt+1 − θt‖
2 + q(θt+1)
= g(θt) + 〈∇θh(θt,α∗(θt)),θt+1 − θt〉+ Lg2 ‖θt+1 − θt‖
2 + q(θt+1)
= g(θt) + 〈∇θh(θt,αt+1),θt+1 − θt〉+ Lg2 ‖θt+1 − θt‖
2 + q(θt+1)
− 〈∇θh(θt,αt+1)−∇θh(θt,α∗(θt)),θt+1 − θt〉
= g(θt) + q(θt) + min
θ∈Θ
[
〈∇θh(θt,αt+1),θ − θt〉+ Lg2 ‖θ − θt‖
2 + q(θ)− q(θt)
]
− 〈∇θh(θt,αt+1)−∇θh(θt,α∗(θt)),θt+1 − θt〉,
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where the last equality follows the definition of θt+1. Thus we get,
g(θt+1) + q(θt+1)
≤ g(θt) + q(θt) + min
θ∈Θ
[
〈∇θh(θt,αt+1),θ − θt〉+ Lg2 ‖θ − θt‖
2 + q(θ)− q(θt)
]
− 〈∇θh(θt,αt+1)−∇θh(θt,α∗(θt)),θt+1 − θt〉
= g(θt) + q(θt) +
1
2Lg
2Lg min
θ∈Θ
[
〈∇θh(θt,αt+1),θ − θt〉+ Lg2 ‖θ − θt‖
2 + q(θ)− q(θt)
]
− 〈∇θh(θt,αt+1)−∇θh(θt,α∗(θt)),θt+1 − θt〉
1
≤ g(θt) + q(θt) + 12Lg 2L11 minθ∈Θ
[
〈∇θh(θt,αt+1),θ − θt〉+ L112 ‖θ − θt‖
2 + q(θ)− q(θt)
]
−〈∇θh(θt,αt+1)−∇θh(θt,α∗(θt)),θt+1 − θt〉
≤ g(θt) + q(θt)− 12LgX (θt,αt+1) + L12‖αK(θt)−α
∗(θt)‖R, (16)
where 1 is due to [37, Lemma 1]. Now if we choose
K1 ≥ 2
√
8κ
(
2 log 2 + log (LgL12R) + 2 log
(1

)
+ 12 log
(2∆
σ
))
,
we have
L12R‖αK(θt)−α∗(θt)‖ ≤ 
2
4Lg
,
due to Lemma 2. Combining this inequality with (16) and summing up both sides of the inequal-
ity (16), we obtain
T−1∑
t=0
(
1
2Lg
X (θt,αt+1)− 
2
4Lg
)
≤ g(θ0) + q(θ0)− (g(θT ) + q(θT )) ≤ D.
As a result, by picking T ≥ 4LgD
2 , at least for one of the iterates t ∈ {1, · · · , T} we have
X (θt,αk(θt)) ≤ 2.
On the other hand, for that point t from Lemma 3, if we choose
K2 ≥ 2
√
8κ
(
logL22 + log (2L22R+ gmax + Lp +R) + 2 log
(1

)
+ 12 log
(2∆
σ
))
we have Y(θt,αt+1) ≤ 2. Finally setting K = max{K1,K2} will result in Y(θt,αt+1) ≤ 2 and
X (θt,αt+1) ≤ 2. This completes the proof.
Theorem 3. [Formal Statement] Consider the min-max zero sum game
min
θ∈Θ
max
α∈A
(
f(θ,α) = h(θ,α)− p(α) + q(θ)
)
,
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where the function h(θ,α) is concave. Define fλ(θ,α) = f(θ,α) − λ2‖α − αˆ‖2 and gλ(θ) =
max
α∈A
h(θ,α) − λ2‖α − αˆ‖2 − p(α) for some αˆ ∈ A . Let D = gλ(θ0) + q(θ0) −minθ∈Θ (gλ(θ) + q(θ))
and Lgλ = L11 +
L212
λ be the Lipschitz constant of the gradient of gλ. In Algorithm 1 if we set
η1 =
1
L22 + λ
, η2 = 1Lgλ , N =
√
8(L22+λ)
λ − 1, λ = min{L22, 2√2R} and choose K and T large
enough such that,
T ≥ NT () , 8LgλD
2
,
and
K ≥ NK() , 2
√
8κ
(
C + 2 log
(2

)
+ 12 log
(2∆
λ
))
,
where C = max
{
2 log 2 + log (LgλL12R), log (L22 + λ) + log
(
2 (L22 + λ)R+ gλmax + Lp +R
)}
,
κ = L22+λλ and gλmax = maxα∈A ‖∇αh(θt,α)‖+ λR, there exists t ∈ {0, . . . , T} such that (θt,αt+1) is
an -FNE of the original problem (2).
Proof. We only need to show that when the regularized function converges to -FNE, by proper
choice of λ, the converged point is also an -FNE of the original game.
It is important to notice that in the regularized function the smooth term is hλ(θ,α) = h(θ,α)−
λ
2‖α− αˆ‖2. As a result, from Assumption 3 we have
‖∇αhλ(θ,α1)−∇αhλ(θ,α2)‖ = ‖∇αh(θ,α1)−∇αh(θ,α2)− λ(α1−α2)‖ ≤ (L22 + λ)‖α1−α2‖,
where the last inequality is obtained by combing triangular inequality and Lipshitz smoothness of
the function h(., .). Additionally, ∇θhλ(θ¯, α¯) = ∇θh(θ¯, α¯).
Now, based on Definition 3, a point (θ¯, α¯) is said to be –FNE of the regularized function if
Xλ(θ¯, α¯) ≤ 2 and Yλ(θ¯, α¯) ≤ 2 where
Xλ(θ¯, α¯) , −2L11 min
θ∈Θ
[
〈∇θh(θ¯, α¯),θ − θ¯〉+ q(θ)− q(θ¯) + L112 ||θ − θ¯||
2
]
,
and
Yλ(θ¯, α¯) , 2(L22 + λ) max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θ¯, α¯)− λ(α¯− αˆ),α− α¯〉 − p(α) + p(α¯)− (L22 + λ)2 ||α− α¯||
2
]
.
For simplicity, let X0(·, ·) and Y0(·, ·) represent the above definitions for the original function. In
the following we show that by proper choice of λ the proposed algorithm will result in a point that
X0(·, ·) ≤ 2 and Y0(·, ·) ≤ 2. To show this, we first bound the Y0(·, ·) by Yλ(·, ·):
Y0(θt,αt+1)
=2L22 max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)− L222 ||α−αt+1||
2
]
1
≤ 2(2L22 + λ) max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)− (2L22 + λ)2 ||α−αt+1||
2
]
=2(2L22 + λ) max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1)− λ(αt+1 − αˆ) + λ(αt+1 − αˆ),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)
− 2L22 + λ2 ||α−αt+1||
2
]
,
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where 1 is based on [37, Lemma 1]. Hence,
Y0(θt,αt+1)
≤22L22 + λ
L22 + λ
(L22 + λ) max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1)− λ(αt+1 − αˆ) + λ(αt+1 − αˆ),α−αt+1〉 − p(α)
+ p(αt+1)− 2L22 + λ2 ||α−αt+1||
2
]
≤4(L22 + λ) max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1)− λ(αt+1 − αˆ) + λ(αt+1 − αˆ),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)
− 2L22 + λ2 ||α−αt+1||
2
]
=4(L22 + λ) max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1)− λ(αt+1 − αˆ),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)
− L22 + λ2 ||α−αt+1||
2 − L222 ||α−αt+1||
2 + 〈λ(αt+1 − αˆ),α−αt+1〉
]
≤4(L22 + λ) max
α∈A
[
〈∇αh(θt,αt+1)− λ(αt+1 − αˆ),α−αt+1〉 − p(α) + p(αt+1)
− L22 + λ2 ||α−αt+1||
2
]
+ 4(L22 + λ) max
α∈A
[
−L222 ||α−αt+1||
2 + 〈λ(αt+1 − αˆ),α−αt+1〉
]
≤2Yλ(θt,αt+1) + 2L22 + λ
L22
λ2R2,
where 1 is based on [37, Lemma 1] and the last inequality follows the definition and optimizing
the quadratic term. As a result, by choosing λ ≤ min{L22, 2√2R} , O() we have,
Y0(θt,αt+1) ≤ 2Yλ(θt,αt+1) + 2L22 + λ
L22
λ2R2 ≤ 
2
2 +
2
2 = 
2,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that by running Algorithm 1 with the given inputs,
the regularized function has resulted in a 2–FNE point. Now, since X (θt,αt+1) is same for both
original and regularized function, by picking T ≥ NT () , 4LgλD2 = 4D2
(
L11 + L
2
12
λ
)
, O(−3) , we
conclude X0(θt,αt+1) ≤ 2. This completes the proof.
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